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UNIFORM INTERPRETATION: NOTICE OF NONCONFORMITY 
Francesco G. Mazzotta* 
This Article is about uniform interpretation as it pertains to the 
nonconformity notices under CISG Article 39.1 Article 39, which is one of 
the most heavily-litigated provisions of the CISG, provides in relevant part:2 
The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does 
not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within 
a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it. 
I will focus chiefly on two aspects of Article 39(1): (1) what constitutes a 
“reasonable time” within which buyers must notify sellers of a “lack of 
conformity” and (2) what level of specification is required to establish “the 
nature of the lack of conformity.” 
I. REASONABLE TIME 
It is well-established that all the circumstances of a particular case, 
including, but not limited to, nature of the goods, trade usages, and practices 
between the parties must be considered in determining reasonable time.3 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Dottore in Giurisprudenza, Università degli Studi di Napoli “Federico II” (Italy); L.L.M., 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law; J.D., University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
1 While my focus is mainly on CISG Article 39, it should be acknowledged that Articles 40 and 44 
are equally important in the context of buyer’s obligation to notify seller of lack of conformity of goods, 
as they set forth exceptions to the general rule of Article 39. 
2 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 39(1), Apr. 11, 
1980, 14 U.N.T.S. 3. 
3 See, e.g., Tribunale [District Court] di Rimini, Italy, 26 Nov. 2002, http://cisgw3.law.pace 
.edu/cases/021126i3.html (It.); Tribunale [District Court] di Vigevano, 12 Luglio 2000, No. 405, 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html (It.); see also JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 369 (4th ed. 2009); HERBERT 
BERNSTEIN & JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN EUROPE 89 (2d ed. 2003); CISG 
Advisory Council Opinion No. 2, Examination of the Goods and Notice of Non-Conformity Articles 38 
and 39, 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. (2004) [hereinafter CISG-AC Opinion No. 2]; Ingeborg Schwenzer, 
National Preconceptions that Endanger Uniformity, 19 PACE INT’L L. REV. 103, 120–22 (2007); PETER 
 
180 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 38:179 
 
Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.184 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Early cases (mostly German), presumably consistent with domestic law, set 
very short time limits for the notice.4 
More recent cases, however, breaking from their domestic traditions, 
have adopted more generous approaches. One approach in particular has 
drawn a great deal of interest: the “Noble Month.” “The concept of a ‘Noble 
Month’ is not to be taken too literally as always being one month. It is 
intended as a yardstick, an outer framework of one month notification, which 
can be altered depending on the specific factors concerning the goods.”5 
One benefit of the noble month approach is increased predictability in 
the application of Article 39(1). Another benefit is the “amalgamation of 
timeframes to stop an increasing diversification in setting of timeframes 
under Article 39 transnationally,” otherwise known as “homeward trend.” 
While I wholeheartedly believe that predictability and uniformity are of 
the utmost importance, I have some reservations with setting presumptive 
periods of reasonableness. 
First, since the noble month is not a strict rule but a presumption, one 
must necessarily assume that it is a rebuttable one, meaning that the party 
fighting the presumption must overcome it. Apart from “burden of proof” 
issues,6 I do not see how shifting burdens can improve predictability or 
uniformity given that it will not change how courts determine 
reasonableness. 
Second, the Convention does not define what “within a reasonable time” 
means, and the choice of not defining the term is deliberate.7 
                                                                                                                           
 
HUBER & ALASTAIR MULLIS, THE CISG: A NEW TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 159–
61 (2007); PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & PETRA BUTLER, UN LAW ON INTERNATIONAL SALES 127 (2009); 
see, e.g., Albert H. Kritzer, Reasonableness, https://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/ reason.html (regarding 
the reasonableness standard) (“What is ‘reasonable’ can appropriately be determined by ascertaining 
[inter alia] what is normal and acceptable in the relevant trade.”). 
4 See THE DRAFT UNCITRAL DIGEST AND BEYOND: CASES, ANALYSIS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
IN THE U.N. SALES CONVENTION 379 (Franco Ferrari, Harry Flechtner & Ronald A. Brand eds., 2004). 
5 Camilla B. Andersen, Article 39 of the CISG and its “Noble Month” for Notice-Giving; A 
(Gracefully) Ageing Doctrine? 30 J.L. & COM. 185, 187 (2012). 
6 BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 88; see also UNCITRAL DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON 
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 172 
(2016) [hereinafter UNCITRAL DIGEST]. 
7 Professor Honnold summarized the legislative history of CISG Articles 39, 40 and 44 as follows: 
These three articles embody a delicate compromise of views that were vigorously pressed 
during UNCITRAL proceedings and at the 1980 Diplomatic Conference. Indeed, this is one 
of the few points where perceptions of differing regional and economic interests came to the 
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[The Convention drafters] could easily have included a presumptive period in 
Article 39(1), and the process of negotiating the Convention’s text would have 
been the proper milieu for arriving at an internationally-accepted compromise. 
The drafters, however, eschewed reference to any specific period and chose a 
radically flexible standard—a “reasonable time”—designed to vary with the facts 
of each situation. Instituting a presumptive “reasonable time” for Article 39(1) 
notice invades the function of the Convention’s drafters and the sovereign 
prerogatives of the Contracting States.8 
Indeed, the German Supreme Court, after initially adopting the noble month 
approach,9 more recently seems to have backed away from the idea of a 
presumptive reasonable time under Article 39(1).10 
Finally, even if we, commentators, were all to agree that noble month is 
the way to go, that would not prevent the courts (especially from certain 
jurisdictions), from disregarding it. 
In her analysis of the status of the noble month doctrine, Professor 
Andersen noted: 
A search of all reported CISG cases on Article 39 from the United States has failed 
to turn up a single one referring to the “Noble Month” or a comparable reasoning 
that strikes a compromise with other legal systems. The Anglo-American 
mentality as demonstrated here, is clearly not embracing a comparative approach, 
or attempting to formulate a more predictable guideline for this notice.11 
                                                                                                                           
 
fore. Representatives of several industrial States, primarily of the Continent of Europe, 
stressed the importance of maintaining strict notice requirements embodied in their domestic 
rules. This position was opposed primarily by representatives of developing States. This 
opposition reflected fears that defects in heavy machinery might appear long after the 
machinery is delivered and put into use and that purchasers might be unaware of the drastic 
effects of delay in giving notice. 
HONNOLD, supra note 3, at 365. See also CISG-AC Opinion No. 2, supra note 3, at 381–83; HARRY M. 
FLECHTNER, Buyer’s Obligation to Give Notice of Lack of Conformity, in THE DRAFT UNCITRAL 
DIGEST AND BEYOND: CASES, ANALYSIS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE U.N. SALES CONVENTION 377, 
377–79 (Franco Ferrari, Harry Flechtner & Ronald A. Brand eds., 2004). 
8 HONNOLD, supra note 3, at 372 (footnote omitted); see also BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra 
note 3, at 90–91 (“[T]he concept of a ‘standard’ notification period seems out of tune with the letter and 
spirit of the flexible Convention rules.”). 
9 CLOUT Case No. 123 [Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Germany, Mar. 8, 1995]; 
CLOUT Case No. 319 [Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Germany Nov. 3, 1999] [hereinafter 
BGH]; see also Andersen, supra note 5, at 187–88. 
10 CLOUT Case No. 822 [Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Germany Jan. 11, 2006]; 
see also Andersen, supra note 5, at 189; Flechtner, supra note 7, at 372. 
11 Andersen, supra note 5, at 200. 
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Unfortunately, that is not the only case or the last one showing a strong 
homeward trend. Consider this more recent gem. In Shantou Real Lingerie 
Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Native Group International, Ltd., the district court 
stated:12 
Although the text of Article 39 refers only to a “lack of conformity of the goods,” 
see CISG art. 39(1) (emphasis added), at least one court has extended Article 39 
to other breaches of contract, such as late deliveries[.] [citing a U.S. CISG 
case] . . . . The analogous provision of the UCC, section 2-607, also has been 
interpreted as extending to late deliveries. See Sara Corp. v. Sainty Int’l Am., Inc., 
No. 05 Civ. 2944 (JCF), 2008 WL 2944862, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008); see 
also Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(“Caselaw interpreting analogous provisions of Article 2 of the [UCC], may also 
inform a court where the language of the relevant CISG provisions tracks that of 
the UCC.”). To be sure, section 2-607, which requires buyers to inform sellers of 
“any breach” of contract, is more susceptible to this interpretation. See UCC § 2-
607 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, this reading is a logical extension of Article 
39, requiring minimal effort from buyers, while providing the seller both the 
opportunity to remedy an alleged defect promptly and some finality for 
transactions in which the goods are accepted. 
However, the situation is not as bleak as it would otherwise appear. Consider 
what the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit13 stated in a 
recent summary order14: 
On February 4, 2016, an arbitration panel of The Cocoa Merchants’ Association 
of America, Inc. (“CMAA”) ruled that Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo 
Ltda. (“Naranjillo”) had defaulted on its contractual obligations to deliver cocoa 
butter to Transmar. It ordered Naranjillo to pay Transmar $2,606,626.60. The 
award was based on six nearly identical contracts Naranjillo and Transmar entered 
into on August 30, 2012 for delivery of UTZ Certified cocoa butter over the course 
of six months in 2013. 
The district court vacated the CMAA’s award by order of September 22, 2016. 
Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo Ltda. v. Transmar Commodity Group 
Ltd., No. 16-cv-3356, 2016 WL 5334984 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2016) 
(“Naranjillo”). . . . The district court relied on Section 10(a)(4), which allows for 
vacatur, in relevant part, “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.” It found 
that Naranjillo and Transmar had not actually agreed to arbitrate their disputes 
                                                                                                                           
 
12 Shantou Real Lingerie Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Native Grp. Int’l, Ltd., No. 14cv10246-FM, 2016 WL 
4532911, at *4 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016) (emphasis added). 
13 The same Court of Appeal that authored Delchi in 1995. 
14 Transmar Commodity Grp. Ltd. v. Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo Ltda., 721 F.App’x. 
88, 89–90 (2d Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) (showing the U.S. courts are capable of curtailing homeward 
trends). 
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before the CMAA or anywhere else, so the CMAA did not have any power to rule 
on their dispute. Id. at *4‒6. 
In coming to this conclusion, the district court applied New York law. Naranjillo, 
2016 WL 5334984, at *4. It did so in error. As a contract between the United 
States and Peru, it is governed by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”). “Generally, the CISG governs sales 
contracts between parties from different signatory countries” unless the parties 
clearly indicate an intent to be bound by an alternative source of law. Delchi 
Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027 n.1 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The 
CISG . . . is a self-executing agreement between the United States and other 
signatories. . . .”); Status, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980), http://www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html (showing that Peru 
is a signatory country). Although the CMAA’s standard contract contains a 
choice-of-law provision designating New York law, the parties dispute whether 
that document is part of these contracts at all. The CMAA’s choice of law 
provision therein therefore cannot guide us. 
Even if the district court is correct that the “caselaw interpreting the CISG is 
relatively sparse,” Naranjillo, 2016 WL 5334984, at *4 (quoting Hanwha Corp. 
v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc., 760 F.Supp.2d 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)), that fact 
alone does not warrant substituting New York law for the CISG. In fact, we have 
specifically [stated] that “[b]ecause there is virtually no case law under the [CISG, 
at least as of 1995], we look to its language and to ‘the general principles’ upon 
which it is based.” Delchi, 71 F.3d at 1027. Moreover, New York law differs from 
the CISG in several important respects. In particular, Article 8(3) requires courts 
to give “due consideration” to extrinsic evidence of the reasonable expectations 
of the parties if their subjective intent is at odds. See U.N.C.I.S.G. Art. 8(3), 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-
CISG-e-book.pdf; MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova 
d’Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998) (calling Article 8(3) “a 
clear instruction to admit and consider parol evidence. . . .”). Moreover, Article 
9(2) evinces “a strong preference for enforcing obligations and representations 
customarily relied upon by others in the industry,” which, of course, cannot but 
be demonstrated through extrinsic evidence. Geneva Pharmaceuticals 
Technology Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002), rev’d in part on other grounds, 386 F.3d 485 (2d Cir. 2004); U.N.C.I.S.G. 
Art. 9(2). New York law, by contrast, has long applied the “four corners rule” that 
prohibits extrinsic evidence unless the face of the document is ambiguous. See 
Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 566-67, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350, 696 N.E.2d 174 (1998). 
The district court erred as a matter of law by relying primarily on the face of the 
contract and the document allegedly incorporated by reference. It should have also 
considered extrinsic evidence concerning “all relevant circumstances of the case 
including the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established 
between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties,” 
U.N.C.I.S.G. Art. 8(3), and “a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have 
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known and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly 
observed by, parties to contracts of the type” at issue here. U.N.C.I.S.G. Art. 9(2). 
Because additional fact-finding will be required in order to adduce such evidence, 
the district court abused its discretion in failing to allow discovery, hold an 
evidentiary hearing, or both. See Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. 
YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We review a decision to 
deny an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.”). Of course, we express no 
view as to whether such extrinsic evidence should lead to the same or a different 
result. 
As I said, there is some hope that the U.S. courts’ at times deeply ingrained 
homeward trend is countered with good examples of how CISG should be 
applied. 
Professor Andersen (echoing Professor Schwenzer) does not hide her 
disappointment with the way the Advisory Council handled the noble month 
doctrine. According to Professor Andersen, “[t]he ‘Noble Month’ was 
rejected by the CISG Advisory Council because it was perceived as an 
absolute fixed timeframe. The main culprit for this perception was the 1999 
[German] Supreme Court Case . . . , which applied the benchmark as a 
mathematical and inflexible doctrine.”15 
Obviously, Professor Bergsten does not see favorably a fixed period of 
reasonableness.16 However, he does so not because he misunderstood the 
noble month doctrine. Rather, he believes that a mechanical application of 
the rule without consideration of the circumstances of the case, as attempted 
by the German Supreme Court in 1999, was an error.17 
It seems to me, therefore, that Professors Schwenzer, Bergsten, and 
Andersen all agree that timeliness of the notice under Article 39 must be 
determined under the totality of the circumstances, not based on a standard, 
rigid timeframe.18 They also all disagree with the approach taken by the 
German Supreme Court in 1999.19 
In the end, even if there is not an acknowledgment of the noble month 
or similar doctrines in U.S. case law, and even if U.S. courts often cite or 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 Andersen, supra note 5, at 199. 
16 CISG-AC Opinion No. 2, supra note 3, at 379 (“No fixed period, whether 14 days, one month or 
otherwise, should be considered as reasonable in the abstract without taking into account the 
circumstances of the case.”) (emphasis added). 
17 Indeed, even Professors Andersen and Schwenzer have reservations with the 1999 decision. See 
Andersen, supra note 5, at 188; Schwenzer, supra note 3, at 112–13. 
18 See generally Andersen, supra note 5, at 188. 
19 See supra note 17. 
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even rely on the principles of domestic statutes or case law, the analysis and 
the conclusions reached by U.S. courts appear to be correct because they are 
generally based on a review of the totality of the circumstances, which, under 
the CISG, is the only uniform standard that should be employed. 
I am not suggesting that failure to consider, or even acknowledge, case 
law from other jurisdictions is acceptable. U.S. courts should acknowledge 
the existence of non-binding decisions and should clearly state why they are 
disregarding them, which, in my opinion, in the context of Article 39, is 
relatively easy to articulate. Thus, while I am blaming U.S. courts to the 
extent that they do not acknowledge or discuss foreign decisions, or even 
worse, cite domestic law to interpret the CISG, I feel less inclined to blame 
U.S. courts for not following other jurisdictions’ acceptance of presumptive 
periods of reasonableness. Indeed, the text of the Convention and its 
legislative history are clear on this matter.20 Timeliness of notice under 
Article 39(1) is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, based on the totality 
of the circumstances. 
Additionally, while the approach taken by the German and Swiss courts 
are to be commended for not importing their domestic rules into the CISG, 
their approach still presents homeward overtures. Indeed, a fixed period of 
time is typical under their domestic rules. The only difference is that under 
domestic rules this period is much shorter than under the CISG. In a way, 
U.S. treatment of the matter is much closer to the text of the CISG than the 
German, Austrian, and Swiss approach. 
Fifteen years later, I reach the same conclusion Professor Bergsten 
reached in 2004: 
While many of the decisions that have been reported to date are unobjectionable 
on their facts, there has been a tendency on the part of some courts to interpret 
CISG articles 38 and 39 in the light of the analogous provisions in their domestic 
law. This has been most overt where the CISG text is similar to that in the domestic 
law. While the method of interpreting in the light of domestic law that also 
requires notice to be given in a reasonable time does not accord with the 
requirement of CISG article 7(1), since it does not give due regard to the 
international character of the Convention, the results in the individual cases are 
difficult to criticize.21 
                                                                                                                           
 
20 BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 90–91 (“[T]he concept of a ‘standard’ notification 
period seems out of tune with the letter and spirit of the flexible Convention rules.”). 
21 CISG-AC Opinion No. 2, supra note 3, at 384–85 (footnotes omitted). 
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II. SPECIFICITY 
As noted, CISG Article 39 requires the buyer to give notice “specifying 
the nature of the lack of conformity.” “Beyond the specificity 
requirement . . . , [the] CISG does not further define the contents of the notice 
required by [A]rticle 39(1).”22 Some early decisions, particularly from certain 
jurisdictions, were overly demanding in the amount of detail necessary to 
meet the standard.23 The trend in more recent cases, however, is less 
demanding.24 
Courts essentially agree that notices must identify the particular 
nonconforming good.25 Additionally, notices “must provide a sufficiently 
detailed notice;”26 however, “the requirements for specifying a lack of 
conformity should not be exaggerated.”27 Notices “framed in quite general 
terms (‘not in order,’ ‘defective quality or delivery of wrong goods,’ ‘inferior 
and poor quality,’ ‘second rate,’ ‘poor workmanship,’ ‘machine must be 
repaired,’ ‘there’s been a complaint’) or general expression of dissatisfaction 
(‘not as we expected/requested’) are generally insufficient for the purposes 
of the CISG.”28 
Based on the extensive case law on this matter, commentators agree that 
specificity depends on the purposes of the notice under Article 39(1), the 
parties’ statements and conduct, and the underlying transaction itself.29 
Courts, similarly, determine specificity based on the circumstances of the 
case. 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 6, at 176. 
23 HUBER & MULLIS, supra note 3, at 158. 
24 See HONNOLD, supra note 3, at 368; see also BGH, Nov. 3, 1999, supra note 9; Tribunale di 
Vigevano, supra note 3. 
25 UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 6, at 174. 
26 HUBER & MULLIS, supra note 3, at 158. 
27 INGEBORD SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE 
OF GOODS 462 (4th ed. 2016); Franco Ferrari, Tribunale di Vigevano: Specific Aspects of the CISG 
Uniformly Dealt With, 20 J.L. & COM. 225, 235–36 (2001). 
28 SCHWENZER, supra note 27, at 463 (footnotes omitted); Ferrari, supra note 27, at 235. See also 
HONNOLD, supra note 3, at 368; UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 6, at 174–76. 
29 UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 6, at 174–76. See HONNOLD, supra note 3, at 368. SCHWENZER, 
supra note 27, at 462–65; HUBER & MULLIS, supra note 3, at 157–58. 
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III. CONCLUSIONS 
I do not believe presumptive reasonable periods for purposes of Article 
39(1) are consistent with the Convention and its legislative history. 
Additionally, I do not believe that failure to adopt such doctrines undermines 
predictability and/or uniformity in the application of the Convention. Finally, 
despite some homeward trend, the results are consistent with the Convention. 
Regarding specificity, more recent cases apply less strict approaches, which 
is consistent with the “reasonable” standard adopted in Article 39(1). 
